Key exchange protocol plays an important role in cryptosystem, by which two sides who communicate with each other over an open network can obtain a common session key to keep the communication secret. Both two communication entities make full use of the received messages to compute a secret session key. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [1] put forward a first key exchange protocol, which cannot make authentication of two communication entities possible. On account of lacking mutual authentication, two parties are subject to the man-in the-middle attack. Since then, some two-party authentication key exchange (2PAKE) protocols are proposed [2] [3] [4] [7] [8] [9] [10] .
PRELIMINARIES

Notation
In this subsection, we first introduce some notations used in this paper as follows: q F : A finite field; G : The cyclic additive group composed of the points on E/ q F ; P : A based point with the order n over E ; E : An elliptic curve defined on finite field q F with an order n; 12 . We propose a two-party authenticated key exchange (2PAKE) on basis of ECC. Both the user A and the server S build key agreement.
Key Agreement
In order to achieve key agreement, two sides go on communicating and authenticating each other. Note that they use the real identity to perform the authentication procedure. Fig. 1 shows the steps of the authentication procedure as follow:
Step 1: The user A  Server: The user A chooses a random number A r and a value Step 2: After that, the user A sends the server an authentication message (i.e.,  , , , , Step 6: The user A verifies the server: Upon receiving the message, the user calculates 2 (, 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to ensure that the proposed 2PAKE protocol is secure, we must consider several important security properties, such as impersonation attack, mutual authentication, deniable authentication attack and forward secrecy.
Resist the Impersonation Attack
If an attack C would like to dress up a legal user A to deceive the server S , he or she has to send the valid message 1 
Resist the Deniable Authentication Attack.
In our protocol, the reason why a third party cannot authenticate the messages from the trusted server is that the third party cannot compute the message 
Provide Mutual Authentication
Mutual authentication is that two sides between a user A and a trust server S can authenticate each other within a protocol. In our scheme, the server can authenticate the legal user by means of checking whether or not A Auth is equal to 11 ( , ( ,
AA H ID H T ), )
A aR . If the legal user can obtain the message from the server, he or she can also authenticate the server by means of checking whether or not SA Auth is equal to 21 ( , ( , ), )
H ID H T a R . Therefore, our scheme can make two sides to authenticate each other possible. So our protocol can also resist Unknown Key Share Attack.
Resist the Public Key Problem
We know that the new user keeps the private key secret and publishes the public key U ID Q . But it is hard to use the user's public key and the server's public key to deduce a secret value for an attack C . The message U Auth which no one can succeed to compute except himself cannot be deduced. However, the attack cannot also dress up as any legal user and communicate with server because they cannot obtain the session key.
Provide Forward Secrecy
Forward Secrecy means that the compromise of both the legal user and the trusted server's long-term private keys of the participating parties would not affect the security of the previous session keys [18] . Our scheme satisfies Forward Secrecy via computing Table 1 shows that it takes more less computations cost than the others. Hence, our protocol is suitable for the application environment.
From the Table 2 , we know that our protocol has many important secure properties. Compared with previous works, our scheme is provided with some based security requirements: impersonation attack, mutual authentication, deniable authentication attack and forward secrecy. Table 1 Computational costs comparisons [11] Our scheme [19] [13] [15] 's computational costs U 's computational costs S T T T   
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a fresh two-party authentication key exchange protocol for mobile environment. Their schemes are subject to some attacks. Moreover, we proposed a fresh 2PAKE protocol which overcomes the drawbacks. We demonstrate that our scheme satisfies impersonation attack resistance, forward secrecy, the deniable authentication and mutual authentication.
